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This paper introduces a class of non-additive anonymous games where agents
are assumed to be uncertain (in the sense of Knight) about opponents’ strategies
and about the initial distribution over players’ characteristics in the game. These
uncertainties are modelled by non-additive measures or capacities. The Cournot-
Nash equilibrium existence theorem is proven for this class of games. It is shown
that the equilibrium distribution can be symmetrized under milder conditions
than in the case of additive games. In particular, it is not required for the
space characteristics to be atomless under capacities. The set-valued map of the
Cournot-Nash equilibria is upper-semicontinuous as a function of initial beliefs
of the players for non-additive anonymous games.
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1 Introduction
Standard non-cooperative game theory assumes that players involved in a game behave
strategically and rationally. They form beliefs about their opponents’ actions and
choose their best response given those beliefs. In most complex situations it is difficult
(or even impossible) to guess the action of an opponent precisely, therefore beliefs
are usually modelled in a probabilistic manner. That is, a player would construct
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a probability distribution which represents her beliefs about future actions of other
players.
This assumption however is not realistic and too restrictive in many circumstances.
There is a growing body of literature which demonstrates that individuals do not form
probabilistic beliefs in a wide range of real-world situations. A classical example is the
Ellsberg’s Paradox (Ellsberg 1961) which shows that individual’s preferences cannot
be supported by a probability measure as suggested by the subjective expected utility
model (Savage 1954).
The main reason for this is the lack of information about future outcomes. The
psychological nature of perceiving uncertainty generated by the incompleteness of in-
formation turns out to be much more richer than it could be explained by a probability
distribution. The notion of uncertainty was introduced back in 1921 by Frank Knight
(Knight 1921) who proposed the distinction between those situations where individual’s
preferences can be described by a probabilistic model (risk) and where such models do
not exist (uncertainty).
Uncertainty naturally would seem to increase as information becomes more com-
plex. Generally in a game with one opponent a player will face less uncertainty than in
the game with ten participants. As the number of players grows, it becomes crucial to
be able to model uncertainty correctly. In this paper we focus on games with a large
number of players who play under informational uncertainty. In such games players
do not consider their opponents individually but rather look at their future actions in
aggregate. Mas-Colell (1986) proposed an approach where players’ beliefs about the
aggregate structure of participants is modelled by a probability distribution and this
distribution is a common knowledge. This assumption is very often unrealistic as in
such big games players do not have precise information about the other participants.
It is unlikely that all players in such a situation would be able to correctly estimate the
probability and agree on this distribution. Can we precisely identify the distribution
of the beliefs of all traders in London Stock Exchange? If individuals do not behave
in accordance with the standard theory in simple situations, as in Elsberg’s paradox,
we cannot expect them to do so in more complex situations. This is the place where
many different psychological biases enter the decision process which lead to paradoxical
outcomes observed in real life games and experiments.
What is the alternative model for players’ beliefs if we are not going to use a
probability measure? A number of authors have introduced models which describe
individuals’ beliefs about future outcomes in the face of uncertainty by a non-additive
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measure (also called capacity or fuzzy measure).1 Within these frameworks a represen-
tative agent maximizes his preference functional, defined as a Choquet integral over a
utility function of future payoffs.
Many empirical investigations provide strong evidence that individuals are not un-
certainty neutral in real life and react to uncertainty differently than they do to risk.
In the majority of cases people are uncertainty-averse (Ellsberg (1961), Camerer and
Ho (1994), Tversky and Fox (1995)); however in some situations they tend to be
uncertainty-loving as well (Curley and Yates (1989), Hogarth and Einhorn (1990)).
The strength of the Choquet expected utility approach is that it makes it possible to
model these different psychological attitudes to uncertainty. In fact, players can be op-
timistic, pessimistic or they can have other forms of mixed preferences. The notion of
non-additive beliefs allows us to model simultaneously the imprecision of information
and the attitude of participants to this imprecision. This brings substantial flexibility
into modelling the structure of players’ beliefs.
The notion of Knightian Uncertainty is not new in Game Theory. Dow and Wer-
lang (1994), Klibanoff (1996), Lo (1996), Groes, Jacobsen, Sloth and Tranaes (1998),
Eichberger and Kelsey (2000), Mukerji (1997), Marinacci (2000) and Ghirardato and
LeBreton (2000) apply this approach to non-corporative games with a finite number of
players and generalize the notion of Nash equilibria to games with uncertainty averse
players. Again, players do not form beliefs about their opponents’ strategies as a prob-
ability measure but their beliefs appear instead to be non-additive functions of subsets
of pure strategies. In some special cases they can be interpreted as a set of possi-
ble mixed strategies that the opponent might play (see Klibanoff (1996), Lo (1996)).
Recently Kozhan and Zarichnyi (2008) generalized the notion of Nash equilibria in ca-
pacities. They extended the results of Glycopantis and Muir (1999), Glycopantis and
Muir (2000) and Aliprantis, Glycopantis and Puzzello (2006) regarding the continuity
of expected payoffs and approximations of mixed strategies to the case of games un-
der Knightian Uncertainty. Glycopantis and Muir (2008) provided an example of such
games for the case of 2 players.
In this paper we develop a concept of Cournot-Nash (CN) equilibrium of anonymous
games with players facing uncertainty. In its classical form an anonymous game is a
generalization of a game with continuum players, introduced initially by Schmeidler
(1973). Hart, Hildenbrand and Kohlberg (1974) and Mas-Colell (1986) developed the
1The reader is referred to Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) for a more detailed
description of these models.
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concept of equilibrium based on the probability distribution of players’ characteristics
rather than on the set of players itself. The contribution of the present paper is to
provide an extension of Mas-Colell’s equilibrium to cases when the players’ are not
able to use a probabilistic distribution due to presence of uncertainty. Instead, they
form their beliefs about the the characteristics of opponents in the form of non-additive
measures or capacities. As a consequence, a whole range of new equilibria arises in this
setup.
The extension of Nash’s existence theorem for non-additive anonymous games is
not as straightforward as in the case of games with finite number of players. The
reason for this is that a Nash equilibrium of an anonymous game is a function of initial
beliefs about agents’ characteristics. In Mas-Colell (1986), this function is defined only
on the space of all additive probability measures while its extension onto the space of
capacities is required for non-additive anonymous games. This extension is provided
below.
Introducing uncertainty into anonymous games allows to relax an assumption under
which a CN equilibrium can be symmetrized. It is also shown that a non-additive
equilibrium distribution can be symmetrized in case of atomic spaces and compact
action spaces.
Another issue investigated in the paper is how the set of equilibria changes as the
beliefs about the distribution over agents’ characteristics change. Since the set of CN
equilibria in anonymous games is a function of the initially defined distribution, some
small distortions in beliefs may cause big deviations in equilibria. Thus, the question
of the sensitivity of the set of CN equilibria to modeling assumptions is also addressed.
Similar problems of the sensitivity of Nash equilibria in the case of additive games have
been considered by Green (1984), Milgrom and Weber (1985), Kajii and Morris (1998)
and others. In line with these papers we investigate the continuity of the equilibrum
set in the topology of weak-* convergence on the space of non-additive measures.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section definitions and preliminaries
are provided. Section 2 provides some preliminary notions and definitions needed for
the analysis and Section 3 gives the definition of a non-additive anonymous game and a
motivating application. The existence theorem is stated and proven in Section 4. The
symmetrization theorem is given in Section 5 and Section 6 provides the result about
upper-semicontinuity of the equilibrium correspondence. Some concluding remarks are




Let X be a compact Hausdorff space and B a σ-algebra of its Borel subsets. De-
note by C(X) the space of all continuous functions on X endowed with the sup-norm
topology.
Definition 2.1. A real-valued set function µ on (X,B) is called a capacity if µ(∅) = 0,
µ(X) = 1 and µ(A) ≤ µ(B) for all A ⊆ B, A,B ∈ B.






non-increasing sequence of sets {An} ⊂ B.
Capacities are often called non-additive measures as they differ from measures only
in the additivity axiom.
For any capacity τ defined on a product of spaces (X × Y,BX × BY ) we can define
its marginals τX and τY by τX(F ) = τ(F ×Y ) and τY (G) = τ(X ×G) for F ∈ BX and
G ∈ BY .
We denote the set of all upper-continuous capacities on X byM(X), and according
to Zhou’s representation theorem (see Zhou (1998)) we can identify it with the set of








(µ(f ≥ t)− 1)dt.
The above integral is called the Choquet integral.3
The set M(X) endowed with the weak-* topology is a compact Hausdorff space.
The base of this topology consists of the set of form
O(µ0, f1, ..., fn, ε) = {µ ∈M(X) : |µ0(fi)− µ(fi)| < ε, i = 1, ..., n},
where µ0 ∈M(X), f1, ..., fn ∈ C(X) and ε > 0.4
2It is assumed that readers have some basic background in the theory of normal functors and
categorical topology. For more information about topological functors see Eilenberg and Moore (1965),
Zarichnyi (1990), Teleiko and Zarichnyi (1999)
3In the name of Gustave Choquet who introduced the notion of integral with respect to non-
additive measures. See Choquet (1953) for more detailed description of its properties. The theory of
the Choquet integral is also described in Denneberg (1994).
4For spaces of probability measures weak and weak-* topologies coincide because of the reflexivity
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The map M : Comp → Comp forms a covariant functor in the category Comp of
compact Hausdorff spaces and their continuous maps. It maps a compact Hausdorff
space X to the spaces of all upper-continuous capacities M(X). Its morphism (action
on continuous functions between compact Hausdorff spaces) Mf : M(X) → M(Y ) is
defined as follows: for given f : X → Y , M(f(ν))(B) = ν (f−1(B)) for ν ∈M(X), B a
Borel set of Y . It is shown in Nykyforchyn and Zarichnyi (2006), this functor is weakly
normal.
Continuous correspondences. LetX and Y be compact Hausdorff spaces. Here-
after we denote by F : X ! Y a set-valued map or correspondence. If all values of
F are closed subsets of Y we will use an alternative notation F : X → exp(Y ), where
exp(Y ) denotes the space of all closed subsets of Y endowed with the Vietoris topology.
A base of this topology consists of the sets of the form
〈U1, ..., Un〉 = {A ∈ exp(Y ) : A ⊂ U1 ∪ ... ∪ Un and A ∩ Ui /= ∅ for every i},
where U1,..., Un run through the topology of Y (see Michael (1951) for more detailed
information).
Definition 2.3. A correspondence F : X ! Y is upper-semicontinuous at x0 if for
each sequence {xn}n∈N ⊂ X convergent to x0 ∈ X and a sequence {yn}n∈N ⊂ Y such
that yn ∈ F (xn) the condition lim
n→∞
yn = y0 implies y0 ∈ F (x0).
F is upper-semicontinuous if it is upper-semicontinuous at all points x ∈ X.
Definition 2.4. A correspondence F : X ! Y is lower-semicontinuous at x0 if for
each convergent to x0 ∈ X sequence {xn}n∈N ⊂ X and a point y0 ∈ F (x0) there exists
a sequence {yn}n∈N such that yn ∈ F (xn) for each n ∈ N and lim
n→∞
yn = y0.
F is lower-semicontinuous if it is lower-semicontinuous at all points x ∈ X.
Definition 2.5. A correspondence F : X ! Y is continuous if it is upper- and lower-
semicontinuous.
The following two lemmata state continuity properties of the intersection and the
union correspondences.
Lemma 2.6. Let X be a compact Hausdorff space. Then the map ∩ : exp(X) ×
exp(X)→ exp(X) is upper-semicontinuous.
of the space of continuous functions on a compact Hausdorff space. In the case of capacities it is not
the case any more. We specify the topology on M(X) in the way that its restriction on the space of
probability measures P (X) ⊂M(X) coincides with the weak-* topology on P (X).
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Proof. Let {An}n∈N and {Bn}n∈N be a sequences of closed subsets of X such that
An ∩ Bn /= ∅. Let A = lim
n→∞
An and B = lim
n→∞
Bn. Consider the sequence {cn}n∈N of
points from An∩Bn converges to the point c0 and assume that c /∈ A∩B. Without loss
of generality we can suppose that c /∈ A. Since the space X is compact and Hausdorff
it is regular and therefore there exist two open sets U and V such that c0 ∈ U , A ⊂ V
and U∩V = ∅. Starting from some number n0 all points cn belong to the neighborhood
U of c0 and, thus, do not belong to V . On the other hand, there exists n1 such that
for all n > max{n0, n1} all sets An should be in the neighborhood 〈V 〉 of the set A. It
is, however, not true because at least one point cn from An does not belong to V and
therefore An ! 〈V 〉. An alternative proof of this lemma can be also found in Teleiko
and Zarichnyi (1999).
Lemma 2.7. Let X be a compact Hausdorff space. Then the map ∪ : exp(X) ×
exp(X)→ exp(X) is continuous.
See Teleiko and Zarichnyi (1999) for the proof.
Let us recall the notion of support of capacities which is defined from the categorical
topology point of view. Let F be a covariant functor and a ∈ F (X) for some compact
Hausdorff space X.
Definition 2.8. The support of an element a ∈ FX is the set
suppF (a) = ∩{A ⊂ X : A is closed and a ∈ F (A)}.
Intuitively, Definition 2.8 refers to the smallest closed subset of X which carry all
the capacity for subsets of X.
The reader is referred to Teleiko and Zarichnyi (1999) for the proof of the following
lemma.
Lemma 2.9. Let F be a monomorphic functor in the category Comp that preserves
the intersections. Then the map suppF,X : F (X)→ exp(X) is lower-semicontinuous.
3 Non-Additive Anonymous Games
We extend the definition of anonymous games given in Mas-Colell (1986) and present
the concept of a non-additive anonymous game.
Let A be a non-empty compact Hausdorff space of actions. Every player is charac-
terized by its continuous utility function u : A ×M(A) → R. Given an action a ∈ A
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taken by a player with a utility function u and the action distribution of all players
ν ∈ M(A), the value u(a, ν) reflects the utility of the player for choosing the action
a. Let us denote by U a compact set of characteristics of the players, i.e. a set of
continuous utility functions on A×M(A) endowed with the supremum norm. A game
with uncertain players is represented by a capacity µ on U which represents common
beliefs about a true distribution over players’ characteristic. The capacity reflects
players’ attitudes to uncertainty which is assumed to be present in the game. As it
was mentioned above, a capacity in general is a non-additive measure and therefore
we naturally call such games non-additive anonymous games. Let us also note that
a probability measure is a special case of capacities which implies that the notion of
Mas-Colell’s anonymous game is a special case of the concept of non-additive games
introduced here. The non-additive equilibrium introduced below generalizes the con-
cept of equilibrium proposed by Hart et al. (1974) and Mas-Colell (1986) for additive
anonymous games.
Definition 3.1. A capacity τ ∈M(U ×A) is called a Cournot-Nash (CN) equilibrium
capacity if:
i) τU = µ;
ii) τ({(u, a) : u(a, τA) ≥ u(a′, τA) for any a′ ∈ A}) = 1,
The notion of Mas-Colell’s anonymous game is a generalized version of a Schmei-
dler’s games with a continuum of players. Anonymity in the game arises since only the
distribution of players’ characteristics µ matters.
According to Mas-Colell’s interpretation the distribution µ is an objective distri-
bution of players’ characteristics, known to all participants of the game. It can be
understood as a mass assigned to every utility of the players involved in the game.
In this paper we assume, however, that the measure µ is non-additive and represents
all players common beliefs about this distribution. As an example of such a situation
let us consider a foreign exchange market consisting of customers who create demand
and supply for domestic and foreign currencies and dealers who set prices and are
essentially market-makers. The strategy for the dealers is to set bid and ask quotes for
currencies to maximize their profits. On the one hand, the bid-ask spread should be
big enough to be able to make a profit, but on the other hand the bigger it is the less
customers will be willing to trade with the dealer. At the same time some customers
may be informed about future changes in fundamentals or other macro variables. As
stated in Lyons (2001):
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”Dealers know that when they trade with someone who is better in-
formed, they can expect to lose money on the trade. If one could
identify better-informed traders before trading, then this would not be
a problem – dealers could choose not to trade, or could adjust price ap-
propriately – but dealers typically cannot identify those who are better
informed.”
Thus, it is critical for dealers to predict the ratio of informed (inf) versus un-
informed (unf) traders in the market. Let us assume that a dealer estimates the
proportion of better-informed traders by 0 < pi < 1 but he is uncertain about this
value. If he underestimates the true value and sets prices with a small bid-ask spread,
he may lose money. In order to insure himself against underestimation of this pro-
portion the dealer can make his decision by assuming that the fraction of informed
traders is pi1 > pi. This will lead to an increase in the bid-ask spread which could
decrease the number of customers willing to trade with him substantially. Thus, both
cases are undesirable. If we assume that the dealer is uncertainty averse and his pref-
erences satisfy the axioms given by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) then the dealer will
behave in this situation according to the worst-case scenario. The capacity which de-
scribes the dealer’s beliefs about the distribution of market participants is given by
min{pδinf + (1− p)δunf : p ∈ (pi − ε, pi + ε)} for some positive (perhaps small) ε which
is subjectively determined. Hence, the dealer’s belief about the agents’ distributions is
formed by a non-additive measure.
Another source of uncertainty which appears in this game is that concerning the
opponents’ actions. Again, in Mas-Colell’s anonymous games beliefs about opponents’
actions are modelled by a probability distributions which are reflected in equilibrium by
the marginal τA. In the game under uncertainty this marginal becomes a non-additive
measure in general.
3.1 Example
Let us a consider simpler but more formal example.5 There is a continuum of players
who will be randomly paired and will play a game where two opponents simultaneously
choose one of two actions L and R. Suppose there are two possible types of people in
the population, the first like to match what their partner does and the second like to
mismatch. Specifically, suppose the payoff matrix for this game is given as follows:




Player 1 L 1,0 0,1
R 0,1 1,0
Each player cannot identify the type of his opponent. His ’expected’ payoff from
choosing to play either L or R depends on his beliefs about how other players in the
population will play. In particular, if his beliefs about the distribution of action choices
in the population is represented by the capacity τA over {L,R} then we have the payoff
for a player of type 1, from playing L is given by the Choquet integral
u1(L, τA) = τA({L})u1(L,L) + (1− τA({L}))u1(L,R) = τA({L}).
The expected payoff of a player of type 1 from playing R is given by the Choquet
integral
u1(R, τA) = τA({R})u1(R,R) + (1− τA({R}))u1(R,L) = τA({R}).
Similarly, the expected payoff of a player of type 2 from playing L or R are given by
the respective Choquet integrals
u2(L, τA) = τA({R})u2(L,R) + (1− τA({R}))u2(L,L) = τA({R})
u2(R, τA) = τA({L})u2(R,L) + (1− τA({L}))u1(R,R) = τA({L}).
A game is characterized by a capacity µ on U = {1, 2}. Let us assume that µ({1}) > 0
and µ({2}) > 0, that is, there are positive common beliefs (possibly non-additive)
about the presence in the population of players of both types.
Let us consider some special cases of CN equilibria. Let
τ ∗(∅) = 0 and τ ∗(U × A) = 1
τ ∗({i, a}) = 0 for all (i, a) ∈ U × A
τ ∗({(1, L), (2, R)}) = 1
τ ∗({(1, R), (2, L)}) = 0
τ ∗({(1, L), (1, R)}) = µ({1})
τ ∗({(2, L), (2, R)}) = µ({2})
τ ∗({(1, L), (2, L)}) = 1
τ ∗({(1, R), (2, R)}) = 1
τ ∗((U × A) \ {(i, a)}) = 1 for all (i, a) ∈ U × A
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It is easy to see that τ ∗ is a capacity. Let us show that τ ∗ is also a CN equilibrium. First
note that τ ∗U({1}) = τ ∗({(1, L), (1, R)}) = µ({1}) and τ ∗U({2}) = τ ∗({(2, L), (2, R)}) =
µ({2}). Finally, we have
u1(L, τ ∗A) = τ
∗
A({L}) = τ ∗A({R}) = u1(R, τ ∗A) = 1
u2(R, τ ∗A) = τ
∗
A({L}) = τ ∗A({R}) = u2(L, τ ∗A) = 1.
Hence
τ ∗({(u, a) : u(a, τ ∗A) ≥ u(A, τ ∗A)}) = 1
as required.
Let us note that by construction τA({L}) = τA({R}) = 1. This means that there ex-
ists an equilibrium where players are extremely optimistic and believe with probability
(non-additive) one that the nature will always be on their side. Therefore, according to
their beliefs, whatever they choose to play their payoff will be positive. This fact may
seem counter-intuitive. However, human behavior in real life is also inconsistent with
the classical notion of rationality. People buy lotteries knowing that on average (under
additive probability) they will loose. This fact however does not prevent them from
expecting to get a valuable prize. They are optimistic and this optimism makes their
decisions not fully rational in the classical sense. This example illustrates how game
theory can explain why people often do not behave in accordance with a (”additive”)
CN equilibrium.
In the same way we can derive a pessimistic equilibrium where players will always
expect a zero payoff.
4 CN Equilibria and the Existence Theorem
In this section the first result we give is the existence theorem for CN equilibria in non-
additive anonymous games. To establish this we need the following auxiliary lemmata.
Let
K(τA) = {(u, a) : u(a, τA) ≥ u(A, τA)},
B′1(µ) = {τ ′ : τ ′U = µ},
B′′1 (τA) = {τ ′ : τ ′A = τA},
B(τA) = {τ ′ : τ ′(K(τA)) = 1}.
Lemma 4.1. The correspondence K : M(A)! U × A is upper-semicontinuous.
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Proof. Let us consider an arbitrary sequence {νn}n∈N ⊂ M(A) which converges to a
capacity ν0 ∈M(A) as n→∞ and assume that there exists a sequence {(un, an)}n∈N ⊂
U×A such that (un, an)→ (u0, a0) with (un, an) ∈ K(νn) for every n ∈ N and (u0, a0) /∈
K(ν0). This last condition implies that there is an a′ ∈ A such that u0(a0, ν0) <
u0(a′, ν0). Denote ε = u0(a′, ν0)− u0(a0, ν0).
Since un → u0 uniformly with n→∞ there exists a number N1 ∈ N such that for
all n > N1 and all (a, ν) ∈ A×M(A)
|u0(a, ν)− un(a, ν)| < ε
4
.
On the other hand the continuity of u0 implies that there exists N2 ∈ N such that for
each n > N2 it hold
|u0(a0, ν0)− u0(an, νn)| < ε
4
and |u0(a′, ν0)− u0(a′, νn)| < ε
4
.
Thus, if n > max{N1, N2} we obtain
un(an, νn) < u0(an, νn) +
ε
4











This condition however contradicts the assumption that (un, an) ∈ K(νn). Hence,
(u0, a0) ∈ K(ν0) and this implies the upper-semicontinuity of the correspondence K.
Lemma 4.2. The correspondence B : M(A)!M(U × A) is upper-semicontinuous.
Proof. Let νn ∈ M(A) for all n ∈ N, ν ∈ M(A) and νn → ν. Consider arbitrary
sequence τ ′n ∈ M(U × A) which converges to τ ′ ∈ M(U × A) with n → ∞ and covers
{νn}n∈N, i.e. τ ′n ∈ B(νn) for every n ∈ N. Let us assume that τ ′ /∈ B(ν), that is
τ ′(K(ν)) < 1. This means that there exists (u0, a0) ∈ supp(τ ′) ⊂ U × A such that
(u0, a0) /∈ K(ν). (4.1)
On the other hand, since τ ′n ∈ B(νn) we have that
supp(τ ′n) ⊂ K(νn) (4.2)
for every n ∈ N. Lower semicontinuity of the map supp (see Lemma 2.9) implies that
there exists a sequence (un, an)n∈N converging to (u0, a0) such that (un, an) ∈ supp(τ ′n)
for every n ∈ N and, according to (4.2) (un, an) ∈ K(νn). Upper-semicontinuity of the
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correspondenceK (see Lemma 4.1) implies however that lim
n→∞
(un, an) = (u0, a0) ∈ K(ν)
which contradicts with (4.1). Thus, τ ′ ∈ B(ν) and therefore the correspondence B is
upper-semicontinuous.
Mas-Colell (1986) proved that the set CNE of all CN equilibria of an additive
anonymous game is not empty. We now consider the analogous result for CN equilibria
in non-additive anonymous games. The proof is similar in spirit to that given by Mas-
Colell (1986) and is based on the topological results stated above.
Theorem 4.3. Let µ be a non-additive anonymous game. Then CNE /= ∅.
Proof. Since U and A are compact Hausdorff spaces, so areM(U) and M(U ×A). The
set B′1(µ) is compact and convex subset of M(U × A) and the set K(τA) is closed in
U ×A. Define a correspondence Φ : B′1(µ)→ B′1(µ) by Φ(τ) = B′1(µ) ∩B(τA) for each
τ ∈ B′1(µ). It is clear that Φ(τ) is convex and compact for all τ . This correspondence
is upper-semicontinuous due to Lemmata 2.6 and 4.2. Therefore, the conditions of the
Fan fixed point theorem are satisfied (see Fan (1952)). Hence, there exists τ ∈ Φ(τ),
that is, τ(K(τA)) = 1.
Remark 4.4. Note that in spite of the fact that in the case of additive measure µ,
additive equilibria is a subset of non-additive equilibria, the above existence theorem for
non-additive games is not a consequence of Mas-Colell’s Theorem 1 in general. Mas-
Colell’s case can only cover situations where beliefs about the player’s distribution
is additive and does not tell us anything about the existence of equilibrium under
uncertainty. Let us look at this in more detail.
First of all let us note that the characteristics spaces U are not identical for additive
and non-additive games. Since P (A) ⊂ M(A), the set of players characteristics under
uncertainty is broader. Each player has to determine the expected payoff in the case
if beliefs about opponents actions are non-additive and this brings more variety to the
set of possible payoff functions. Let us denote by U ′ the set of payoff functions on
A × P (A) defined as restrictions of those from U . In this way we define a continuous
restriction map r : U → U ′.
In order to make a connection between the two types of anonymous games (additive
and non-additive) we define a restriction µ′ of the capacity µ ∈ M(U) on M(U ′) by
µ′ =Mr(µ). If µ happens to be additive (there is no uncertainty in the game), so is its
restriction µ′. Thus, if τ ′ ∈ P (U ′×A) is an equilibrium for the game µ′, one can easily
construct an equilibrium τ ∈ P (U × A) for µ by τ(E) = τ ′(E ∩ (U ′ × A)). Thus, in
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the case of an additive capacity we do not need to prove a separate existence theorem.
However, if µ is not additive, its restriction µ′ might not be additive in general and
hence Mas-Colell’s theorem would not be applicable. This motivates the use of non-
additive equilibria in the presence of uncertainty and shows that Mas-Colell’s concept
of equilibrium does not always work.
5 Symmetric equilibria
An important property of CN equilibria, considered by Mas-Colell (1986), is their
symmetry.
Definition 5.1. A CN equilibrium τ for a game µ is symmetric if there is a measurable
function f : U → A such that τ(graph(f)) = 1.
Under a symmetric equilibrium distribution players with the same characteristic
take the same action from A. In fact, a symmetric equilibrium in an anonymous game
is analogous to a pure strategy equilibrium in a finite player game. The function f
assigns to each characteristic u from U a unique action a from A that all players with
characteristic u choose under this equilibrium. Thus, existence of a symmetric equilib-
rium in the anonymous additive game implies existence of a pure strategy equilibrium.
There is a difference between symmetric equilibrium in additive and non-additive
anonymous games. In additive games payers will play strategies that are not specified
by function f with probability 0 while a symmetric equilibrium does not rule out
possibilities of other strategies in non-additive games due to presence of uncertainty.
Coming back to the example in Section 3.1, equilibrium distribution τ ∗ is symmetric.
There exists function f : {1, 2} → {R, L}, defined by f (1) = R, f (2) = L, which
satisfies the condition of Definition 5.1. Indeed, graph(f) = {(1, R), (2, L)} and it is
shown that τ ∗(graph(f)) = 1. In this equilibrium each player has optimistic beliefs
according to which he will be matched with an opponent of type 1. In this case a
player of type 1 is better off if he plays R and a player of type two receives higher
payoff under strategy L.
Although, a CN equilibrium distribution always exists for additive anonymous
games, there may be no symmetric equilibrium in general. Mas-Colell (1986) showed
that if the game µ is atomless and the action set is finite, then there is a symmetric
Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
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The concept of non-additive anonymous games allow us to establish a much more
general result. The sufficient condition when a CN equilibrium distribution can be
symmetrized is given as follows.
Definition 5.2. A CN equilibrium τ for a game µ can be symmetrized if there exists
a symmetric CN equilibrium distribution τ ′ such that K(τA) = K(τ ′A).
Let τ ∈ M(U × A) be a CN equilibrium distribution for a non-additive game
µ. Consider the correspondence Bτ : U ! A acting by the formula Bτ (u) = {a ∈
A : (u, a) ∈ K(τA)}.
In the case of additive anonymous games, Khan and Sun (1987) prove that every CN
equilibrium distribution can be symmetrized if µ is atomless and finite. Later, Khan
and Sun (1995) relaxed the finiteness assumption and extended the result up to count-
able compact action spaces. Rath, Sun and Yamashige (1995) go further and establish a
more general result which states that each CN equilibrium distribution τ of an atomless
game can be symmetrized if the setD = {µ◦f−1 : f is a measurable selection from Bτ}
is closed. However, in all these cases, the game is required to be atomless. In the non-
additive case, this condition is not necessary any more.
Proposition 5.3. If there is a Borel selection f : U → A of Bτ such that
τA(im(f)) = 1
then τ can be symmetrized.
Proof. Let us construct a symmetric CN equlibrium capacity τ ′ satisfying the condition
of Definition 5.2. For any Borel set G ∈ U × A we set τ ′(G) = τ(G) if graph(f) ! G
and τ ′(G) = 1 if graph(f) ⊆ G.
Let us note first that τ ′ is a capacity. Indeed, for any F,G ∈ U×A such that F ⊂ G
we have τ ′(F ) = τ(F ) ≤ τ(G) = τ ′(G) if graph(f) ! G, τ ′(F ) = τ(F ) ≤ 1 = τ ′(G) if
f(U) ! F and graph(f) ⊆ F , τ ′(F ) = 1 = τ ′(G) if graph(f) ⊆ F .
Let us show that K(τ ′A) = K(τA). As the set K(τA) depends on the marginal τA,
we have to show that this marginal does not change while switching from capacity τ
to τ ′. Let F ⊂ A such that im(f) ⊂ F . According to the condition of the proposition,
τ(F ) = 1 = τ ′(F ). If im(f) ! F then graph(f) ! U×F which implies that τ(U×F ) =
τ ′(U × F ) by the construction of τ ′. Thus, τ ′A(F ) = τA(F ).
Finally, τ ′ is a CN equilibrium capacity, since im(f) ⊆ K(τA) = K(τ ′A) and hence
τ ′(K(τ ′A)) = 1.
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Remark 5.4. By definition, the capacity of the set of actions im(f), which players use
in the new symmetrized equilibrium, has to be equal to 1. The condition τA(im(f)) = 1
makes sure that it is possible to modify the equilibrium τ without changing its marginal
distribution τA.
By definition of the equilibrium, τ(K(τA)) = 1. As a result, according to the
construction of the correspondence Bτ one finds that τA(im(Bτ )) = 1. This means
that all actions which are in the set of pay-off maximizing actions have a total (non-
additive) measure of 1.
When the equilibrium distribution (capacity) τ is being symmetrized, the same
condition should hold for the symmetrized equilibrium τ ′. By the concept of sym-
metrization, we do not want to change the marginal τA and therefore the condition
τ ′A = τA should be satisfied. Thus, one should be able to find a selection from the
correspondence Bτ such that all actions from the set of pay-off maximizing actions
should have in total measure 1.
For example, let A = {a1, a2} and U = {u1, u2} and let τ being the equilibrium
such that K(τA) = {(a1, u1), (a2, u1), (a2, u2)} and τA(a2) < 1. There exist two possible
selections: either f(u1) = a1 and f(u2) = a2 or f(u1) = a2 and f(u2) = a2. If one
decides to use the second option to construct the symmetrized equilibrium τ ′, this will
destroy the condition τ ′A = τA since τ
′(a2) = 1.
Remark 5.5. An additive game with atoms may not have a symmetric CNED. The
following example is due to Rath et al. (1995). Consider a game with the action set
A = {a1, a2} and let u ∈ U be given by u(a1, ν) = 12 , u(a2, ν) = 1 − ν(a2) with
ν ∈ P (A). Let µ = δu denote the game (a Dirac measure concentrated on u).
Let τ be a CNED of µ. Suppose τA(a2) <
1
2 . Then u(a1, τA) < u(a2, τA) ⇒
τ(K(τA)) = τ(u, a2) = 1⇒ τA(a2) = 1 and we get a contradiction. Hence, τA(a2) ≮ 12 .
In the same way we can conclude that τA(a2) ≯ 12 and thus, the only possible case is
τA(a1) =
1
2 and τA(a2) =
1
2 . The only equilibrium distribution τ is that defined by
τ({u, a1}) = 12 and τ({u, a2}) = 12 . Since every player has the same utility function,
the space of characteristics is a singleton {u} and Bτ (u) = {a1, a2}. There may be only
two possible selections: f(u) = a1 or f(u) = a2 each of them has graph of measure
1
2 .
This implies τ is not symmetric and cannot be symmetrized.
If one allows distributions to be non-additive, then a symmetric equilibrium can be
easily constructed. For example, capacity τ(u, a1) = 1, τ(u, a2) =
3
4 is a CN equilibrium
capacity for µ, as the selection f which maps u to a1 has a graph {(u, a1)} of capacity
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1. However, it is worth noting that not every CN equilibrium can be symmetrized. For
instance, a capacity defined by τ(u, a1) = τ(u, a2) =
1
2 (which is additive) cannot be
symmetrized even under non-additive beliefs (the same argument as above applies).
Therefore, the previous result holds under weaker conditions than in the additive
case. This can be seen from the proof of the Theorem from Khan and Sun (1987). They
in fact show how to construct the selection which satisfies the condition of Proposition
5.3 for games with atomless space of players’ characteristics and finite number of ac-
tions. Under uncertainty, a CN equilibrium can be symmetrized for games with any
compact space of actions (not necessarily finite) and it also does not require the space
of characteristics to be atomless.
6 Upper-semicontinuity of CN Equilibria
Having proved the existence theorem, we now consider a sequence of non-additive
games to study how variations in players’ beliefs affects the set of equilibria. The
second result of the paper is given in the following theorem, where we investigate the
sensitivity of the CN equilibrium to the initial parameter. It asserts then when the
beliefs vary ”continuously”, the set of CN equilibria varies upper-semicontinuously.
Theorem 6.1. The CN equilibria correspondence CNE: M(U)!M(U ×A) is upper-
semicontinuous.
Proof. Let us define a correspondence B1 : M(U)×M(A)!M(U×A) by B1(µ, τA) =
B′1(µ) ∩ B′′1 (τA). The fact that the correspondence B1 is continuous implies from the
open-multicommutativity of the functor M , which is proved in Kozhan (2006).
The set of all CN equilibria of the game µ can be represented as CNE = ∪
τA∈M(A)
(B1(µ, τA)∩
B(τA)). Lemmata 2.6, 2.7 and 4.2 imply that the correspondence CNE is upper-
semicontinuous.
The statement of Theorem 6.1 says that if we consider a sequence of games {µk}k∈N
with µk ∈ M(U) which converges to µ∗ and a sequence if their CN equilibria {τk}k∈N
such that τk ∈ CNE(µk) ⊂M(U ×A) which converges to τ ∗ then τ ∗ is a CN equilibria
for the game µ∗ (that is, τ ∗ ∈ CNE(µ∗)). This means that small deviations from the
initial beliefs will not decrease the set of CN equilibria.
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7 Conclusion
Much of economic theory studies situations which can be modelled by anonymous
games. Many models of market games involve the notion of perfect competition, where
no participant has the market power to influence prices. The framework of anony-
mous games developed by Schmeidler (1973) provides the required tools to model this
situation.
This paper considers an extension of anonymous games to the case where players
are faced with Knightian Uncertainty. In particular, it is assumed that there are two
types of uncertainty: about possible strategies of opponents and about the distribution
over agents’ characteristics involved in the game. Both types of uncertainty have been
modelled using capacities, which are generalizations of probability distributions. This
paper has generalized Mas-Colell’s (Mas-Colell 1986) equilibrium concept for anony-
mous games to the case of games under uncertainty. We have established the existence
theorem of CN equilibria for such games. A sufficient condition is given under which
a CN equilibrium can be symmetrized. This condition is weaker than for additive
anonymous games.
Moreover, we have shown that the CN equilibrium correspondence which maps
initial beliefs about the distribution over agents’ characteristics into the set of CN
equilibria is upper-semicontinuous. This fact could be useful when considering approx-
imations and investigating stability and sensitivity of the set of CN equilibria.
The notion of uncertainty brings more flexibility into the structure of CN equilibria
of the games. A clear advantage is that we can incorporate more psychological aspects
into the model which will reflect the real world more realistically. Players are allowed
to construct their beliefs in optimistic or pessimistic manners, to be uncertainty averse
or uncertainty loving. The cost is the increase in the number of equilibria in the game,
although some equilibria can be easily filtered out as unrealistic.
Another issue which concerns capacities is how to use them in real games. The
problem is that up to our knowledge there is no randomization device which could
generate realizations from a non-additive distribution. Since there is uncertainty in
the model, there is also uncertainty in the equilibrium and in what a realization of
the equilibrium will be. A non-additive equilibrium distribution gives us a general
picture of how equilibrium strategies would look on average. A non-additive equilibrium
enables us to see how the players will tend to play. This has a strong relation to
the notion of fuzzy sets – one could see where approximately the set is, but cannot
18
precisely determine its boundaries. How to play a capacity strategy remains an open
and challenging question.
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